A fuel oil syndicate, which operated at Eskom’s power plants and cost the utility and South Africa R1.2 billion and more over a number of years, was described in detail by former Eskom CEO Andre De Ruyter in his new book titled, Truth to Power: My Three Years Inside Eskom.
De Ruyter recounted his realisation that Eskom was hampered by corruption on a scale never before seen in addition to neglected equipment, aging power plants, and a deteriorating talent base.
When a plant trip or outage occurs, fuel oil is required to restart the coal fires in the boilers, a process known as “putting fires in”. Sometimes, when the quality of the coal is very bad, operators would add fuel oil to increase combustion.
De Ruyter stated that “one single power station, Tutuka, was burning about 43% of all the fuel oil Eskom purchased – purchasing 36 deliveries of fuel oil per day.”
Nevertheless, he continued, it was illogical for one power plant out of fifteen to legitimately be burning close to half of Eskom’s fuel oil imports, especially with the high number of trips and Tutuka’s subpar coal quality.
The discovery was made on April 21, 2021, when De Ruyter and Eskom COO Jan Oberholzer installed Sello Mametja as the new station manager at Tutuka. Mametja soon learned that the station was being looted mercilessly by a fuel oil cartel.
Mametja’s inquiry and the analysis of CCTV material showed that the oil suppliers had been engaging in “round-tripping” practices.
The fuel tankers crossed the weigh-bridge, but they never unloaded their load. The supplier would receive payment for both deliveries, including for the fuel oil that was never delivered, because the driver would pick up a delivery note, leave the gate, drive around for a while, and then return later, according to De Ruyter.
De Ruyter also wrote that these vendors would receive R100 million each month amounting to R1.2 billion yearly.
If you considered what it represented, he continued, “Tutuka’s fuel oil bill at R100 million a month was sickening: for years, this was the amount that had flowed out of Eskom and into the corrupt coffers.”
The fact that this type of corruption involves cooperation from a full chain of people raises additional concerns about this realisation.
He went on to say that not all criminal organizations were as obnoxious and rapacious as the Tutuka conmen.
“Some suppliers at other stations would deliver 25,000 kgs of fuel oil but only offload 20,000 – the remaining 5,000 would be resold to Eskom later, adding a juicy profit margin to the supplier’s operations,” he claimed.
Furthermore, there had been questionable behaviour at the power plant for a number of years; this wasn’t the only instance. You may begin to understand the scope of the wrongdoing by taking into account that Eskom operates 14 additional coal-fired power plants, none of which were completely free from corruption, continued De Rutyer.
The former CEO declared, “The scale of the rot is greater and more pervasive than many people realise.”
Twenty Eskom officials were suspended as a result of the discovery, and two were detained for fraud, theft and corruption.
These officials have not yet released a statement in response to the allegations made in the book.
